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USE OF ANOTHER'S TRADEMARK IN A WEB
PAGE META TAG: WHY LIABILITY SHOULD
NOT ENSUE UNDER THE LANHAM ACT FOR
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
INTRODUCTION

John Developer, a budding entrepreneur and computer hacker,1 decided to start and operate a sports news information service on the
Internet. He planned to incorporate sponsor paid advertising in order
to make enough money to keep his web site operating while turning a
nice profit for himself. John's success ultimately depended on attracting enough people to his web site to entice advertisements on it.
But, how could John lure people to his web site? John finally realized
that the solution to his problem involved adding the names of other
prominent sports news services in the meta tag2 of his home page. As
luck would have it, John's web site was an overnight success. Unfortunately, one of the names that John Developer incorporated in his web
page's meta tag was a federally registered trademark owned by Charlie Marker.
Jill Searcher also conducts business on the Internet; she owns and
operates a search engine. Her search engine subsequently accessed
and cataloged John's web site and recorded its information for future
use by anyone searching the Internet.
Soon thereafter, Charlie Marker accessed Jill Searcher's search engine. Charlie entered his trademark as the query term and began running his search. When the results were returned, Charlie noticed that
John Developer's web site was prominently displayed in the search
results. To ease his curiosity, Charlie visited John's web site. Not
finding his registered trademark anywhere on the visible portion of
John's home page, Charlie proceeded to view the underlying source
document of the web page. Charlie Marker discovered that his trademark was contained as a keyword in the meta tag of John's home
page. Outraged, Charlie Marker proceeds to sue John Developer for
1. "Among professional programmers, the term hacker implies an amateur or a
programmer who lacks formal training. Depending on how it [is] used, the term can
be either complimentary or derogatory, although it is developing an increasingly derogatory connotation." hacker - PC Webopaedia Definition and Links (last modified
Jan. 19, 1998) <http://webopedia.internet.com/TERM/h/hacker.html>.
2. A meta tag is "[a] special HTML tag that provides information about a [w]eb
page. Unlike normal HTML tags, meta tags do not affect how the page is displayed.
Instead, they provide information such as who created the page, how often it is updated, what the page is about, and which keywords represent the page's content.
Many search engines use this information when building their indices." meta tag - PC
Webopaedia Definition and Links (last modified Feb. 15, 1998) <http://
webopedia.internet.com/FERM/m/meta-tag.html> [hereinafter Meta Tag]. See infra
Part II for a more detailed discussion of the Internet and its components.
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trademark infringement under the Trademark Act of 1946, commonly
referred to as the Lanham Act.3
This Comment argues that liability for trademark infringement
should not ensue under the Lanham Act when an unauthorized user
incorporates a senior holder's registered trademark in a web page
meta tag. 4 Part I discusses the Lanham Act and the various elements
that must be satisfied in order to prevail on a cause of action for trademark infringement. Part II provides a background of the Internet and
World Wide Web. Part III discusses how a typical cause of action for
trademark infringement in this situation may arise. Part IV analyzes
the issue and demonstrates why liability should not ensue. In short,
the argument takes the position that an action for trademark infringement stemming from the unauthorized use of another's trademark in a
meta tag cannot be sustained.
I.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK UNDER THE LANHAM ACT FOR A
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT ACTION

A.

Statutory Provisions

In order to understand how a trademark infringement action can
arise through the use of another's trademark in a meta tag, it is necessary to set forth the general legal framework for an infringement ac-5
tion. A trademark is regarded as a type of intellectual property.
More specifically, a trademark "is a word, name, symbol, device, or
other designation, or a combination of such designations, that is distinctive of a person's goods or services and that is used in a manner
that identifies those goods or services and distinguishes them from the
goods or services of others." 6
The term trademark is also commonly used to refer to three other
types of protected symbols: service marks, trade dress, and trade
names.7 A service mark is typically a trademark that is used in connection with advertising and sales of services. 8 On the other hand,
trade dress is "[t]he design of elements that constitute the appearance
or image of goods or services as presented to prospective purchasers,
including the design of packaging, labels, containers, displays, decor,
or the design of a product, a product feature, or a combination of
product features."9 Finally, a trade name is "any name used by a per3.
4.
raised,
U.S.C.
5.

Trademark Act of 1946 §§ 1-50, 15 U.S.C. 99 1051-1127 (1994).
This Comment will not address other related causes of action that might be
such as federal trademark dilution under the Lanham Act of 1946 § 43(c), 15
§ 1125(c) (1994).
See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1987).
6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995).
7. See RICHARD L. KIRKPATRICK, LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK

LAW xvii (1995).

8. See RESTATEMENT
9. Id. § 16.

(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
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son to identify his or her business or vocation."1 Trademark holders
can utilize these three types of trademarks to identify their goods,
services, or businesses, which consumers recognize as emanating from
a particular source. 1 However, for the purposes of this Comment, the
use of the word "trademark" will include only typographical symbology-trademarks and service marks-that are protected under federal
law and can be textually represented as machine readable software
12
instructions.
Under federal law, the substantive rights of trademark holders are
set forth in the Lanham Act. 3 Owners of registered trademarks can
assert trademark infringement and false advertising claims under sections 32(1) and 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Specifically, section 32(1)14
states:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services
on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered
mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or
advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of
goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies
hereinafter provided.' 5
Moreover, section 43(a)1 6 provides that
(a) Civil action
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word,
term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof,
or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which(A) is likely to cause confusion . . . as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
11. See White Tower Sys., Inc. v. White Castle Sys., 90 F.2d 67, 69 (6th Cir. 1937).
12. Since meta tags do not currently support the inclusion and use of imagery,
trade dress will not be addressed in this Comment.
13. See Trademark Act of 1946 §§ 1-50, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1.) (1994).
15. Id. (emphasis added).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994).
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his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents

the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or
commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he
17
or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.

In short, these two sections of the Lanham Act forbid the unauthorized use of a registered trademark where such use is likely to cause
confusion as to the source or origin of the trademark or where it misrepresents the nature or quality of the goods or services associated
with it. Thus, the Lanham Act is a mechanism that provides protection in the marketplace for registered marks.
Protection under the Lanham Act extends to several key areas.
First, the Lanham Act protects a business' goodwill by protecting the
consumer's ability to distinguish between goods of competing producers.18 Consequently, a trademark serves to guarantee to the purchaser a level of assurance of quality with respect to the particular
good bearing the mark.19 A consumer's ability to buy or not to buy,
free from confusion, is protected. 0 Under this protection, if goods
bought under a particular trademark are satisfactory, a purchaser
might readily purchase them again based on recognition of the associated trademark. A corollary to this is that if the goods bearing the
trademark are unsatisfactory, potential purchasers can readily avoid
them in the future.2 '
Second, the Lanham Act enables the trademark owner to create
and subsequently develop a market for his product or service through
advertising.22 Although consumer demand for goods and services is
usually created through advertising, secondary demand for it may be
created by acknowledgment of the trademark itself.23 In addition,
since a trademark serves to associate a level of quality assurance with
a particular good or service, the owner's right to control product consistency is protected. 4
17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
19. See DAPHNE ROBERT, THE NEW TRADE-MARK MANUAL 5 (1947).
20. See Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 354 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) ("By identifying the source of products, a trademark brought consumers
back often to buy from a reliable producer and thus provided economic rewards for
excellence. Thus, trademarks both encourage quality products and reduce consumers'
costs for market searches.").
21. See ROBERT, supra note 19, at 5.
22. See id. at 6.
23. See id.

24. See El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392, 395 (2d Cir.
1986) ("One of the most valuable and important protections afforded by the Lanham
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With respect to its place in the law, trademark law "is but a part of
the broader law of unfair competition."25 Consequently, trademark
infringement actions under the Act are a subset of the larger realm of
law dealing with the protection of persons and businesses from unfair
competition in the marketplace. In general, "[trademark]
[i]nfringement is that species of unfair trading which comes about
when one person adopts and uses either the same mark previously
used by another or a mark which so resembles that of another in
sound or appearance as to mislead, confuse, or deceive purchasers."26
B. Notable Requirements for the Cause of Action
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Standing
Before an action for trademark infringement can be sustained, the
plaintiff must allege subject matter jurisdiction and standing. Subject
matter jurisdiction exists where the defendant's mark or advertising is
being used in interstate commerce or where it substantially affects interstate commerce. 27 On the other hand, in order to have standing to
raise a claim, the Act requires that a plaintiff show some competitive
injury. 2 Itisimportant to note, however, that standing is not extended to those consumer-plaintiffs who have been deceived merely
by the defendant's conduct.2 9
2. Likelihood of Confusion
In addition to subject matter jurisdiction and standing, it is necessary to show that the alleged infringing action on the part of the defendant was "likely to cause confusion" as set forth in sections 32(1)
or 43(a) of the Lanham Act.30 This phrase is the key in establishing a
claim for trademark infringement or false advertising.31 Courts have
typically analyzed the phrase "likely to cause confusion" on an elemental basis. In particular, the word "likely" means probable, as it is
insufficient that such confusion be merely "possible. '3 2 The phrase
Act is the right to control the quality of the goods manufactured and sold under the
holder's trademark.").
25. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918).
26. ROBERT, supra note 19, at 158.
27. See Kampgrounds of Am., Inc. v. North Del. A-OK Campground, Inc., 415 F.
Supp. 1288, 1291 (D. Del. 1976) (finding that advertising and apprising potential customers "constitute[s] sufficient indicia of interstate business to fall within the 'commerce' requirements of the Lanham Act.").
28. See KENT D. STUCKEY, INTERNET AND ONLINE LAW § 7.02(1)(a)(i) (1996).
29. See Halicki v. United Artists Communications, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th
Cir. 1987) ("The statute is directed against unfair competition. To be actionable, conduct must not only be unfair[,] but must in some discernible way be competitive.")
(emphasis added).
30. See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
31. See STUCKEY, supra note 28, § 7.02(1)(a)(iv), at 7-11.
32. See Bongrain Int'l (Am.) Corp. v. Delice de France, Inc., 811 F.2d 1479, 1486
(Fed. Cir. 1987) ("The statute refers to likelihood, not the mere possibility, of confu-
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"to cause" means that the trademark's unauthorized use "must be the
legal cause and cause in fact of the confusion."3 3 And finally, the

word "confusion" is generally construed as "an act of mistaking one
thing for another, of failing to note distinctions, and of falsely identifying."" Thus, to show that the use of another's trademark is "likely to
cause confusion," the three parts of this phrase must be satisfied.
With respect to "confusion" as set forth under the Lanham Act, 35
courts have recognized several different types of confusion as being
actionable. The first type, source confusion, 36 results when the public
associates the goods or services with the wrong source or sponsor.37 A

second type, sponsorship confusion,38 results from the misperceived
endorsement, approval, affiliation, or certification by one source of
goods or services with that of another. 39 A third type, reverse confusion, 4 0 occurs when the consumer believes that the newcomer is actually the source or sponsor of the prior user's goods. 41 And the final
sion."). See also KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, § 1.1, at 1-3. This inquiry will be referred to as the "likeliness test for trademark infringement." See infra Part IV.B.1.
33. See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, § 1.1, at 1-4. See also Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All
Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1980) ("Confusion, in the legal
sense means confusion of source."); Smithkline Beckman Corp. v. Pennex Prod. Co.,
605 F. Supp. 746, 752 (E.D. Pa. 1985) ("The characteristic that all the unfair competition claims share is that confusion is the direct and proximate result of an act under-

taken by the defendant."). See generally RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§§ 430-

34 (1965) (describing the causal connection required to establish liability). This inquiry will be referred to as the "causation test for trademark infringement." See infra
Part IV.B.1.
34. See Rockland Mortgage Corp. v. Shareholders Funding, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 182,
196 (D. Del. 1993) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 477 (3d
ed. 1971)).
35. See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.

36. See

KIRKPATRICK,

supra note 7, § 1.4.A, at 1-15.

37. See James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of The Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 275 (7th
Cir. 1976) ("[Tjhe test is not whether the public would confuse the marks, but
whether the viewer of an accused mark would be likely to associate the product or
service with which it is connected with the source of products or services with which
an earlier mark is connected.").
38. See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, § 1.4.B, at 1-15.
39. See id at 1-15 to -16. See, e.g., James Burrough Ltd., 540 F.2d at 274 (stating
that the goods or services must be "in some way related to, or connected or affiliated
with, or sponsored by").
40. See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, § 1.4.C, at 1-17.
41. See Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 474 (3d Cir.
1994).
Ordinarily, one expects that the new or junior user of the mark will use to its
advantage the reputation and good will of the senior user by adopting a similar or identical mark. Reverse confusion occurs when a larger, more powerful company uses the trademark of a smaller, less powerful senior owner and
thereby causes likely confusion as to the source of the senior user's goods or
services. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947
(7th Cir. 1992) (Quaker Oats Co.'s use of 'Thirst-Aid' in advertising for
Gatorade was trademark infringement of the 'Thirst-Aid' registered trademark owned and formerly used by a small Vermont company).
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type of actionable confusion is associational or subliminal confusion.4 2
Associational confusion results when the consumer subliminally or
subconsciously identifies the properties and reputation of one product
with those of another, even though the consumer can identify the particular manufacturer or producer of each product.4 3 With associational confusion, a newcomer could gain a foothold in the first user's
market by exploiting association with the prior user's trademark.44
3.

Intent to Cause Mistake or to Deceive or Misrepresent

Another important factor in an action for trademark infringement is
the defendant's intent. Under the Lanham Act, it is not necessary to
allege that the defendant's conduct was deceptive or fraudulent so
long as a likelihood of confusion exists.45 Absent evidence of misrepresentation or fraud, a standard of strict liability is imposed.4 6 If evidence of intent to defraud, cause mistake, or misrepresent exists, the
plaintiff can make allegations against the defendant per sections
32(1)1 7 and 43(a)4 8 of the Act. However, such allegations must be
pleaded with particularity in order to avoid a motion to dismiss.4 9
4.

Contributory Infringement

An action for contributory infringement can also be raised under
the Lanham Act against any party "who knowingly play[s] a significant role in accomplishing a wrongful purpose."5 In order to sustain
an action of contributory trademark infringement, the aforementioned requirements for a direct infringement action must be satisfied.5" Absent an allegation of a third party's direct knowledge of the
infringing action, some measure of understanding must be proven in
42. See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, § 1.4.D, at 1-18.
43. See Farberware, Inc. v. Mr. Coffee, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 291, 302 (D. Del. 1990)
("Subliminal confusion causes 'the consumer to identify the properties and reputation
of one product with those of another, although he can identify the particularmanufacturer of each."') (quoting Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. American Cyanamid Co., 361 F.
Supp. 1032, 1044 (D.N.J. 1973)).
44. See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, § 1.4.D, at 1-19.
45. See STUCKEY, supra note 28, § 7.02(1)(a)(vi), at 7-14; see, e.g., Henri's Food
Prod. Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 359 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that a finding of
fraudulent intent or bad faith is not required to prove infringement when there already exists a likelihood of confusion) (citing Task Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn, Inc.,
350 F.2d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 1965)).
46. See Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Serv., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143,
1152 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Sellers bear strict liability for violations of the Lanham Act.")
(citing Henri's Food Prod. Co., 717 F.2d at 359).
47. See supra text accompanying note 15.
48. See supra text accompanying note 17.
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.").
50. See STUCKEY, supra note 28, § 7.02(1)(a)(iii) (citing Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives
Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982)).
51. See supra Part I.B.1-3.
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order to render the third party contributorily liable for trademark
infringement.52
5. Evidentiary Considerations
Another important consideration in the analysis is the evidentiary
support required to sustain a cause of action for trademark infringement. Of particular interest in such an action is where the burden of
proof lies. Specifically, the party alleging such infringement has the
53
burden of proof.

Another factor is the effect of registration of the trademark. Registration does not automatically entitle the registrant's trademark to
protection under the Act.5 4 The registrant must still establish that the
requisite elements of infringement set forth in the Lanham Act, particularly the likelihood of confusion or intent to defraud, are satisfied
in order for an action to be sustained.
The use of expert opinion to support an action for trademark infringement is also worth noting. Courts have typically viewed expert
opinion on infringement actions with disfavor. 55 A majority of the
courts have determined that infringement is within the realm of everyone's common knowledge and experience, and that the jury has a duty
to make the determination on such issues. 5 ' Thus, it is generally held
that expert opinion is given little weight.57
In summary, several factors should be considered when pursuing an
action for trademark infringement. Of notable importance are (1) the
jurisdictional requirements, (2) the confusion threshold, (3) the defendant's intent, (4) contributory infringement considerations, and (5)
52. See STUCKEY, supra note 28, § 7.02(1)(a)(iii) (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry
Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that defendant may be vicariously liable for trademark infringement if he knows or has reason to know of infringement). But c.f. Hard Rock Caf6 Licensing Corp. v. Concession Serv., Inc., 955 F.2d
1143, 1152 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Although the 'reason to know' part of the Standard for
contributory liability requires [defendant] (or its agents) to understand what a reasonably prudent person would understand, it does not impose any duty to seek out and

prevent violations.") (citing

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 12(1) & cmt. a

(1965)).
53. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 510
n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) ("The traditional rule [is] that the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to establish a likelihood of confusion by a fair preponderance of the
evidence.").
54. See Scott v. Mego Int'l, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 1118, 1127 (D. Minn. 1981) (indicating that "registration does not assure the protection of a trademark in an infringement
action").
55. See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, § 1.8.C, at 1-40.
56. See Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 300 n.29 (3d
Cir. 1991) ("The testimony of industry insiders on likelihood of confusion should be
given little weight, since . . . the determination of likelihood of confusion must be
made from the standpoint of a reasonable prudent buyer from the lowest stratum of
the relevant buying class.").
57. See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, § 1.8.C, at 1-40.
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evidentiary considerations. If any of these requirements cannot be addressed with specificity, the action should fail.
II.

WEB-BASED FRAMEWORK

To analyze a problem involving trademark infringement when a
third party uses another person's trademark in a web page meta tag, it
is necessary to have a basic understanding of the Internet as well as its
associated protocols and programming mechanisms.
The Internet is actually a large collection of computer networks that
runs a common protocol known as the Transmission Control Protocol/
Internet Protocol ("TCP/IP").5 8 Computer users access the Internet
via the common protocol, which then enables them to communicate
with other users throughout the network.59
Another commonly referred to aspect of the Internet is the World
Wide Web ("Web"). The Web is simply a mechanism used to distribute and access data throughout the Internet, which uses another
protocol called the Hypertext Transfer Protocol ("HTTP"). 6 ° It was
designed to combine certain aspects of information retrieval with multimedia communications.61 Through the underlying HTTP protocol,
the Web allows users to access information in many different types of
formats-including text, sound, images, animation, and video-and
treats all searchable files on the Internet as hypertext documents.62
Hypertext, on the other hand, refers to text that contains pointers
or "links" to other text. The use of hypertext allows computer users
to jump from one document to another, while being able to return to
the first document, even when the documents are on different computers at remote locations. 63 Hypertext documents are beneficial because they can employ images, sound, graphics, video, and animation
in addition to traditional textual characters.64
Hypertext documents are accessed via the Web through the use of
software processes known as web servers, each of which is located and
runs on a host computer, thereby forming a configuration known as a
58. See Gary Scott Malkin & April N. Marine, FYI on Questions and Answers;
Answers to Commonly Asked 'New Internet User' Questions, § 3, RFC 1325 (May
1992) (last modified Oct. 12, 1998) <http://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc1325.txt>. See generally W. RICHARD STEVENS, UNIX NETWORK PROGRAMMING § 5.2 (1990) (background information on TCP/IP); T.J. Socolofsky & C.J. Kale, A TCP/IP Tutorial,

RFC 1180 (Jan. 1991) (visited Feb. 27, 1998) <http://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfcll80.txt>.
59. See Malkin & Marine, supra note 58, § 3.
60. See Tim Berners-Lee et al., Hypertext Transfer Protocol-HTTP/1.0,RFC 1945

(May 1996) (visited Feb. 27, 1998) <http://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc1945.txt>.
61. See Gary C. Kessler & Steven D. Shepard, A Primer on Internet and TCP/IP
Tools and Utilities, § 7 RFC 2151 (June 1997) <http://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc2151.txt>.

62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
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web site.65 To access and view hypertext documents on a web site,
computer users employ web browsers, which are nothing more than
consumer software running on a personal computer.66 Both the client
browser and the host web server communicate through the use of the
HTTP.6 7

The portion of a hypertext document that is visually displayed
through the use of a web browser is known as a web page.68 The
hypertext document that actually comprises the underlying web page
is typically written in a base language known as hypertext markup language ("HTML"), a text-based formatting language that is both hardware and software platform-independent. 69 Each construct of the
language is delineated by a plurality of different machine-readable
computer commands or codes called "tags," and the meta tag comprises one of these commands. 70 And finally, a web page source document is the raw file of HTML commands (i.e. the hypertext
document), which allows the creation of the web page when accessed
via a browser.
Users access a particular web page by "pointing" their browser at a
unique address, which allows retrieval of a particular web page on a
web site. This address is expressed in a shorthand format called the
uniform resource locator ("URL"). In general, the URL designates
the location of a unique host computer on the Internet and the location of the web page source document within that host computer's file
structure. 71 Thus, when a user designates a specific URL to visit, by
typing the URL or "clicking" on a link, this user will obtain those web
pages from any location on the Internet.72
In order to facilitate the retrieval of information on the Internet, a
variety of Internet search engines are available. A search engine is
basically a remote accessible program that allows users to perform
keyword 73 searches to facilitate the location of information on the In65. See Web site - PC Webopaedia Definition and Links (last modified June 16,
1997) <http://webopedia.internet.com/TERM/w/website.html>.
66. See Browser - PC Webopaedia Definition and Links (last modified May 14,
1998) <http://webopedia.internet.com/TERM/b/browser.html>.
67. See Kessler, supra note 61.
68. See Web page - PC Webopaedia Definition and Links (last modified June 16,

1997) <http://webopedia.internet.com/TERM/w/web-page.html>.

69. See HTML - PC Webopaedia Definition and Links (last modified Dec. 22,
1997) <http://webopedia.internet.com/TERM/H/HTML.html>.
70. See generally World Wide Web Consortium, W3C's HTML Home Page (last
modified Oct. 12, 1998) <http://www.w3.org/MarkUp/MarkUp.html> (provides access
to HTML specifications).
71. See URL - PC Webopaedia Definition and Links (last modified June 24, 1998)
<http://webopedia.internet.com/TERM/U/URL.html>.
72. See id.
73. A keyword is an index entry that identifies a specific record or document in a
database management system. See Keyword - PC Webopaedia Definition and Links
(last modified Oct. 27, 1997) <http://webopedia.internet.com/TERM/k/
keyword.html>.
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ternet.7 1 Search engines typically access web pages and index or catalog them according to the information contained therein. Thereafter,
they construct databases that can be queried by a user through a
browser.7 5 There are various types of search engines with facilities
that allow searching to cover titles of text documents or web pages,
URLs, or web page source documents. Several of the more popular
search engines7 6 include Altavista,7 7 Hotbot, 78 Infoseek, 9 and
Excite.8
Although the indexing operation performed by the search engine
can be accomplished independent of user interaction, it is possible for
a creator of a web page to control how the web page is indexed by the
search engine. In particular, HTML provides a programming construct called a "meta tag."'" The meta tag allows web page authors to
specify additional keywords for search engines to index and catalog, as
well as accompanying descriptive information for use by other Internet web servers. This is really nothing more than a short abstract of
the web page itself. 82 Therefore, meta tags are useful because they
can be used to augment documents with additional information that is
not normally displayed by an Internet browser. Information stored in
meta tags is not normally displayed when the web page is loaded into
a web browser. However, that information can be extracted and used
by web servers and search engines to identify, index, and catalog the
web page.8 3
As a consequence, the meta tag of an associated web page provides
a way for the designer to have some control over the way a meta tagcapable search engine indexes and catalogs the web page. In operation, a keyword contained in the meta tag of a target web page source
document is accessed by a meta tag-capable search engine at a given
time and lexically analyzed, 84 then the resulting information is stored
74. See Search Engine - PC Webopaedia Definition and Links (last modified Oct.
27, 1997) <http://webopedia.internet.com/TERM/s/search-engine.html>.
75. See Danny Sullivan, How Search Engines Work (visited Feb. 27, 1998) <http://
searchenginewatch.com/webmasters/work.html>.
76. See Danny Sullivan, Search Engines Guide: The Major Search Engines (visited
Feb. 27, 1998) <http://searchenginewatch.com/facts/major.html>.
77. See AltaVista: Main Page (visited Feb. 27, 1998) <http://www.altavista.digital.
com>.
78. See HotBot (visited Feb. 27, 1998) <http://www.hotbot.com>.
79. See InfoSeek (visited Feb. 27, 1998) <http://www.infoseek.com>.
80. See Excite (visited Feb. 27, 1998) <http://www.excite.com>.
81. See Andrew, HTML META Tags (last modified Oct. 7, 1998) <wysiwyg://detail.54/http://vancouver-webpages.com/METAimetatags.detail.html>.
82. See The WDVL: HTML's META-Tag (visited Feb. 27, 1998) <http://
www.stars.com/Authoring/HTML/Head/meta.html> [hereinafter Web Developer].
83. See The WDVL: META Tagging for Search Engines (visited Feb. 27, 1998)
<http://www.stars.comlLocation/MetafTag.html>.
84. Lexical analysis is the first stage of processing a computer language. In this
stage of processing, a stream of characters making up the source document is read one
at a time and grouped into word-like pieces such as phrases, keywords, identifiers,
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in the search engine's database. As a consequence, whenever a user
queries the search engine with the same keyword that was contained
in the meta tag of the target web page, the search engine will use this
keyword to find the web page and allow the user access to it. Thus,
the relationship between the search engine's access and cataloging
functions and the information contained in the meta tag is both content and time dependent.
III.

How

A CAUSE OF AcTION FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
WITHIN A META TAG MIGHT ARISE

A cause of action for trademark infringement in this scenario could
arise in several different ways. For instance, a trademark holder might
happen to examine the web page source document of another's web
page and find his or her trademark included in that page's meta tag.
This scenario is rather unlikely since it essentially requires that the

trademark holder examine the web page source document without a
prior indication of possible use of the trademark on the part of the
web page creator.
Another scenario results when an individual discovers, through the
use of a search engine, that a third party is using the mark without the
holder's permission.86 Under this scenario, a web page is created
which includes another's trademark in a meta tag. That web page is
subsequently accessed and cataloged by a meta tag-capable Internet
search engine. Next, the trademark holder inputs the trademark as an
identifying query into an Internet search engine and notices a web
page that is not owned by him. Further, after examining the web page
and finding that the trademark is not contained on the visible portion
of the page, the trademark holder may then view the underlying web
page source document of the web page to discover the trademark contained in the meta tag. 87 Since the trademark holder may not have
literals, and punctuation. See Denis Howe, Free On-Line Dictionary of Computing
(FOLDOC): lexical analysis from FOLDOC (last modified Oct. 27, 1998) <http://
wombat.doc.ic.ac.uk/foldoc/foldoc.cgi?query=lexical+analysis>
(citing ALFRED V.
AHO ET AL., COMPILERS- PRINCIPLES, TECHNIQUES AND TOOLS 4-5 (1995)).
85. See generally Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 958 F. Supp. 1218,
1219 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (finding false designation of origin by misappropriate use of
plaintiff's trademark).

See generally Joshua Paul, Trademarks and Electronic Com-

merce: Protecting Your Mark from "Invisible" Trademark Infringement and Other
Forms of Trickery on the Internet (visited Feb. 27, 1998) <http://www.cll.com/
pub98.html> (providing an account of the case by the firm representing the prevailing
party).
86. See, e.g., Oppedahl & Larson v. Advanced Concepts, No. 97-CV-1592 (D.
Colo. Dec. 22, 1997 and Feb. 6, 1998) (ordering permanent injunctions). See generally
Oppedahl & Larson Patent Web Server, Advanced Concepts Lawsuit (visited Feb. 27.
1998) <http://www.patents.com/ac/index.sht> (providing an account of the case by the
firm representing the prevailing party).
87. The web page source document may be readily viewed by selecting the "view
source" or similar user-selectable option that is available on the most popular web
browsers such as the "Navigator" by Netscape Communications Corporation or the
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given explicit authorization for the use of this trademark by the particular author of the web page, the holder could file an action for trademark infringement.

IV.
A.

TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS AS APPLIED TO USE
OF ANOTHER'S TRADEMARK WITHIN A META TAG

Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction-TheLaw Does Not
Contemplate Providing Protectionfor a Non-Exposed
Trademark Within a Meta Tag

Under the present law, a suit for trademark infringement due to the
use of another's trademark in a meta tag should be dismissed for a
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 88 As a general proposition, "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the Untied States."89 Accordingly, there must be standing in order to bring forth a cause of
action. Standing may be based on an interest created by the Constitution or by statute.9 0 The Lanham Act's legislative history clearly indicates that the protected mark must be exposed before a violation for
infringement occurs.91 Neither the Act itself nor its legislative history

contemplates trademark protection where the registered mark itself is
not exposed to the general public.9" In fact, there is absolutely no
indication that the legislative history would allow a party to sustain a

cause of action for trademark infringement where the protected mark
is not visible to the public in the normal course of use. Moreover,
there is at least some case law that supports this proposition of expo-

sure.93 As such, the Act does not contemplate violations that arise
"Internet Explorer" by Microsoft Corporation. See generally Welcome to Netscape
Netcenter (visited Feb. 27, 1998) <http://www.netscape.com>; Microsoft Corporation
Home Page; Welcome to Microsoft (last modified Sept. 11, 1998) <http://
www.microsoft.com/>.
88. See supra Part I.B.1.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
90. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951).
91. See ROBERT, supra note 19, at 266 (quoting S. Rep. No. 79-1333 (1946)).
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold. One is to protect
the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a
particulartrade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which
it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has
spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is
protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.
Id. (emphasis added).
92. See Exxon Corp., 695 F.2d at 98 n.1 (stating that the proper test for trademark
infringement is whether the general public is likely to be confused).
93. See Malcolm Nicol & Co. v. Witco Corp., 881 F.2d 1063, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
("The opposer or petitioner has the burden, however, to show that the use was such
that it created 'public exposure of [the] mark that would be expected to have [a]
significant impact on the purchasing public."') (Archer, J., dissenting) (quoting Old
Swiss House, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 569 F.2d 1130, 1133 (C.C.P.A. 1978)).
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from the use of another's trademark within a meta tag, because the
trademark is not exposed to the general public.
It would be presumptuous to extend protection under the Lanham
Act to the non-exposed or "invisible" use of another's trademark in a
meta tag. Since meta tags are not normally exposed to the general
viewing public, a trademark infringement violation should not be sustained under the Act. Only persons with specialized computer programming knowledge, outside the realm of the general public, can
actually understand the meta tag and the information contained
therein when the meta tag is exposed in the web page source document.94 In sum, if additional protection is needed to protect trademark owners from such unauthorized use, new legislation should be
drafted.
B.

Failure to Satisfy Requisite Statute Requirements

1. Use of Another's Trademark Within a Meta Tag Is Not Likely
to Cause Confusion
The use of another's trademark within a meta tag is not likely to
cause confusion under sections 32(1) and 43(a) of the Lanham Act95
because the "likeliness test" for trademark infringement is not satisfied.96 Therefore, liability under the Act should not ensue.
As a general proposition, the mere possibility of confusing the general public is not sufficient to establish liability under the Lanham
Act.97 Moreover, most users only access the visible portion of a web
page, not the underlying web page source document. As such, confusion is possible only when the user displays or otherwise views the
document's source of the web page. Therefore, the likelihood inquiry
must focus on whether the actual or potential user is confused. 98 The
likelihood inquiry is also viewed from the standpoint of an average
user of the general public who may be either an actual or potential
user. This standard is not based on a user who possesses specialized
knowledge of the use of meta tags. Since only a small fraction of the
users ever access and understand the use of meta tags, they would
certainly not qualify as a normal or potential user of the general public as contemplated by the courts. Consequently, no infringing action
should result.99 However, the possibility exists that some users might
94. See Andrew, supra note 81 and accompanying text.

95. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 11 14(1) (1994); 1125(a)(1) (1994).

96. See STUCKEY, supra note 28, § 7.02(1)(a)(iv), at 7-11.
97. See id.
98. See Electronic Design & Sales Inc. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 954 F.2d 713,

716 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[I]n the case of goods and services that are sold, the inquiry

generally will turn on whether actual or potential 'purchasers' are confused.").
99. See Andrew, supra note 81. See also Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co.,
695 F.2d 96, 98 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983).
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examine the web page's source document in the normal course of use
and only a smaller subset of these persons might even understand the
meta tag's function. This level of probability does not rise to the level
contemplated to sustain a trademark infringement action.
The likeliness inquiry also focuses on the meaning of the words to
prospective purchasers.10 0 Thus, even if the web page source document is viewed, and another person's trademark within the meta tag is
exposed, the word or words that make up the trademark must be analyzed to determine whether a likelihood of confusion could result.
There might be many reasons for including a registered trademark
within a meta tag and none of them are related to infringement. For
example, the use of the trademark could merely be a description that
identifies the goods or allows an actual or potential purchaser a way to
identify alternative sources of goods in the marketplace. Therefore,
even if the general public were to access the web page's source document and notice the use of another's trademark in the meta tag, confusion would probably not result.
None of the types of "confusion" can be said to result through the
use of another's trademark in a web page meta tag. 1 1 A prospective
purchaser will not be in a position to be confused since meta tags are
not automatically displayed when browsing the web. Exposure has
02
always been a key element in an action for trademark infringement.'
Since exposure of the trademark on the web page does not occur, the
likelihood of confusion of the prospective purchaser does not exist,
and the intended use of the trademark contained within the meta tag
need not be ascertained. This position is readily apparent when considering a stand-alone web page.
In a stand-alone web page, there is no source, sponsorship, reverse,
or associational confusion because the trademark is not visible on the
web page by the general public. Confusion cannot arise where there is
a remote chance that a user or a potential user of the general public
will be confused.'0 3 For example, in Advanced Sports Concepts, Inc. v.
Baden Sports, Inc.,"°4 the plaintiff asserted that the defendant's sale of
100. See Cullman Ventures, Inc. v. Columbian Art Works, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 96, 128
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("[Slimilarity for purposes of likelihood of confusion means similarity in appearance, sound or meaning.").
101. See supra Part.I.B.2.
102. See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inn, 364 F. Supp. 775, 782 (D.C.S.C. 1973)
(holding that the statutory test for trademark infringement be applied with regard to
the effect of a purchaser having an indefinite recollection of the mark to which he has
been previously exposed). See also In re Honeywell, Inc., 532 F.2d 180, 182 (C.C.P.A.
1976) ("Appellant argues that the transparent disk cannot function as a portion of a
trademark because it is invisible to customers and potential customers. However,
transparency is not invisibility."). In this case, the court implies that if a trademark is
not visible, an infringement action may not ensue. See id.
103. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994). See also ROBERT, supra note 19; STUCKEY, supra note 28.
104. 29 U.S.P.Q.2d. (BNA) 1227, 1230 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
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an oversized basketball with its trademark "Skillcoach" taped over the
plaintiff's trademark "THE BIGBALL" constituted trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. Furthermore, the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant's conduct was "committed with the intent to cause
confusion and to deceive and defraud the public."1 °5 However, the
court found otherwise stating that no confusion resulted because the
plaintiff's trademark was completely hidden or "obliterated" by a removable tape label that was imprinted with the defendant's trademark.10 6 Only if the tape was peeled away could Baden's trademark
have been exposed.10 7
A similar situation holds true for web pages containing another's
trademark in its meta tag. The visible portion of the web page completely masks the underlying non-visible web page source document
and the included registered trademark. Only when one "peels away"
the visible portion of the web page, by viewing the web page's underlying source document, does the trademark within the meta tag become visible. Therefore, following the court's reasoning in the instant
case, no confusion should result due to the inclusion of another's
trademark in a meta tag of a web page.
Additional support for this position is found in Munsingwear, Inc. v.
Jockey Int'l Inc.1" 8 In Munsingwear, the plaintiff instituted a trademark infringement action against the defendant, alleging that the defendant's underwear product would ultimately be confused with the
plaintiff's product by the consuming public. 109 In that case, the court
found that the action for trademark infringement could not be sustained based in part on an allegation of post-sale exposure by the defendant. In reaching its conclusion, the court explained:
As customarily worn, underwear is concealed by other articles of
clothing. The general public does not ordinarily see underwear in
the same manner, and to the [same] extent that it views
outerwear.... The inherently concealed nature of worn underwear
diminishes the concern for post-sale confusion ....The lack of...
exposure of the product to the general public reduces the risk that
any customers will be confused ....1o
Similarly, the risk of confusion due to the use of another's trademark in a meta tag is slight because the underlying, "invisible" source
document is not ordinarily viewed by the general public to the extent
that the public views the overlying and "visible" web page. The inherently concealed nature of the source document minimizes the risk that
confusion will result. As in Advanced Sports, the analysis set forth in
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
See id.
See id.
31 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1146 (D. Minn. 1994).
See id. at 1149.
Id. at 1150.
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Munsingwear supports the proposition that an action for trademark
infringement stemming from the use of another's trademark in a meta
tag should not be sustained.
Confusion does not result even if a web page containing another's
trademark is accessed and subsequently cataloged by a search engine.
In this instance, no source, sponsorship, reverse, or associational confusion results.1 11 A user could not be confused as to the source or
sponsorship of the goods in question because the protected mark
would not be visible to the user when the associated web page is returned as a result of a search query. Concededly, the only confusion
that might be said to result is that of the search engine in including the
web site in the query result; however, trademark infringement only
protects persons from confusion-not search engines." 2
Moreover, a search engine query returns selected web pages that
are accessible by their unique URLs, which may designate the source
or sponsor of the web site." 3 Since a URL provides the actual address or designation of a selected web page, there is no misimpression
that could result under the reverse or associational confusion types
because the URL clearly designates the origin of the web page. However, one can assume that an actual or potential purchaser11 4 browsing
the Internet would understand the basic use and function of the URL
designation at the host computer level. This assumption is reasonable
for two simple reasons: (1) URL host computer designations are
needed in order to access web sites and (2) URLs are commonly advertised on television, radio, and hardcopy media. Thus, one would
be hard-pressed to argue that the general public is likely to be confused when someone uses another's trademark in a meta tag, whether
that web site is accessed with or without the help of a search engine.
Furthermore, liability should not ensue for an action of trademark
infringement under these circumstances because the causation test for
trademark infringement'1 5 is not satisfied. For causation to be established, the plaintiff must show that the injury is fairly traceable to the
defendant's conduct.1 1 6 Merely placing another's trademark in a meta
111. See supra Part I.B.2.
112. See ROBERT, supra note 19. See also supra text accompanying note 91.
113. Where confusion exists at the URL level, courts have sustained an action of
trademark infringement since the exposed domain names can cause consumer confusion. See Comp Examiner Agency, Inc. v. Juris, Inc., No. 96-CV-0213-WMB (CTX),
1996 WL 376600 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 1996); Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Chuckleberry
Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
114. See Calvin Klein Cosmetics v. Parfums de Coeur, Ltd., 824 F.2d 665, 669 n.4
(8th Cir. 1987) ("In applying principles of trademark law, courts commonly refer to
'the consumer,' much like the references made to 'the reasonable person' in resolving
questions of tort law.").
115. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430-34 (1965).
116. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
[Tihe irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact' - an invasion
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tag causes no injury in and of itself due to the fact that the trademark
is not visible to the general public when viewed as a web page. 117 Nor
is injury caused when the search engine accesses, catalogs, and makes
the source document of a web page available for those searching the
Internet.' 1 8 Causation is very difficult to establish under this latter
instance since the plaintiff must prove that the trademark in the given
meta tag contained in the web page source document was accessed
and used by a particular search engine at a particular time. 1 9 In addition, the plaintiff would have to show that when the source document was actually cataloged, the particular search engine used the
trademark in such a fashion that would probably confuse the general
public when it is queried and returns the results.
The only way that a plaintiff could possibly sustain an infringement
action is to require each search engine owner to identify the lexical
approach used by his search engine in indexing and cataloging the
plaintiff's web page. Disclosure would be necessary since different
1 20
search engines perform their lexical functions in different ways.
The plaintiff would have the burden of proving that the particular lexical approach used by the given search engine and the plaintiff's query
caused the search engine to use the trademark in such a fashion that it
harmed the trademark holder.121 Without such a disclosure from the
search engine owner, there would be no means to determine whether
the trademark itself or some other lexical criterion, unique to that particular 122
search engine, or the plaintiff's query, led to the apparent
injury.
Requiring search engine companies to divulge their proprietary
searching and cataloging methods in order to sustain another's action
for trademark infringement would be unduly burdensome and impinge the other protections afforded under various intellectual propof a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and
(b) 'actual or imminent,' not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' Second, there
must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained
of - the injury has to be 'fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not ... the result [of] the independent action of some third
party not before the court.' Third, it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely
,speculative' that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision.'
Id. (citations omitted).
117. See Meta Tag, supra note 2; see also Web Developer, supra note 82.
118. See Sullivan, supra note 75.
119. See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, § 1.1, at 1-4.
120. See Sullivan, supra note 76.
121. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 510
n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
122. For example, the Excite search engine does not utilize meta tags at all, and in
other search engines meta tags are only part of the criterion. See Danny Sullivan,
Search Engine Features Comparison Chart (last modified Aug. 4, 1998) <http://
searchenginewatch.com/webmasters/features.html>.
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erty laws, such as trade secret law. 1 2 3 To force such disclosure from
these companies would also have a chilling effect on the development
of new technologies. For instance, searching and cataloging processes
could be improved thereby eliminating the alleged infringing action
itself. Absent knowledge of the infringing action,'1 24 a plaintiff should
not be able to force a search engine owner to participate in establishing causation against a defendant in a trademark infringement action
under the Lanham Act.
2.

Evidence of Fraud or Mistake Cannot Be Established Simply on
the Basis that Another's Trademark
Was Used in a Meta Tag

Absent the likeliness of confusion, an action for trademark infringement can be negated even if one alleges that another's trademark in a
web page meta tag was used with the intent to cause injury. Absent
any direct evidence of fraud or mistake, such as that which may be
contained in other portions of the web page source document or be
available from an alternative source, an action for trademark infringement cannot be sustained by a plaintiff's mere allegation that the defendant intended to deceive, cause mistake, or misrepresent through
the lone use of plaintiff's trademark in a web page meta tag. 25 Such
an allegation must be pleaded with particularity. 26 The mere inclusion of a word or phrase comprising another person's trademark in a
meta tag cannot be particularly ascertained to mean that the defendant acted with an adverse intent. In fact, there may be several reasons
for including another's trademark in a meta tag that actually reveals
the defendant's good intent.
One reason for including the trademark in a meta tag is just for
advertisement comparison purposes. In this situation, the comparison
advertisement object is contrast, not confusion. 127 Another reason for
including another's trademark in a meta tag is simply to identify related secondary sources of goods or services. 1 28 Consequently, the capability of a consumer to find the best goods and services at the best
123. See generally In re Bolster, 110 P. 547, 548 (Wash. 1910) (defining a trade secret as a non-patented, secret formula or process, which is known only to certain
individuals and used in producing an article of trade). See also IRVING KAYTON, PATENT PRACTICE 1-38 (1985) (explaining that states differ significantly in their treatment
of trade secrets because it is primarily a state law matter).
124. See STUCKEY, supra note 28, § 7.02(1)(a)(iv), at 7-11.
125. See STUCKEY, supra note 28, § 7.02(1)(a)(vi), at 7-14; Henri's Food Prod. Co.
v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 359 (7th Cir. 1983); E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v.
Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. at 510 n.4. See also supra text accompanying notes 45
and 53.
126. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
127. See 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 23.01(6) (3d ed. 1992).
128. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th
Cir. 1992).
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prices in the marketplace is enhanced, not hindered. Therefore, since
the defendant's intent cannot be determined by the mere use of another's trademark in a meta tag, an action for trademark infringement
should be denied.
C. Strong Public Policy ConsiderationsPreclude the Recognition of
an Action of Trademark Infringement When a Third
Person Incorporatesthe Holder's Trademark in a
Meta Tag

Public policy considerations concerning the Internet and its continuing development should be taken into account when determining
whether liability should ensue for the unauthorized use of a registered
mark in a meta tag. Several adverse repercussions would probably

result if this particular trademark infringement action were further
recognized as viable.
First, search engine owners might elect to discontinue using meta
tags in indexing and cataloging web pages in order to avoid possible
court-ordered disclosure of proprietary algorithms or contributory infringement actions. 29 As a consequence, web site developers would
no longer be able to take advantage of the benefits associated with
providing descriptive information such as keywords in their web
pages, which in turn helps facilitate and enhance the entire search process. Furthermore, web browser developers might choose to remove
the function which allows users to view the web page source documents in order to prevent this function from being used as an instrument to enable lawsuits or to prevent itself from being named as a
party in a contributory infringement action. 130 Consequently, web
page developers would no longer be able to learn from their peers by
13

viewing the other developer's HTML tags and commands.

1

But, where the defendant uses a trademark to describe the plaintiff's product, rather than its own, we hold that a commercial user is entitled to a nominative fair use defense provided he meets the following three requirements:
First, the product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable
without use of the trademark; second, only so much of the mark or marks
may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service;
and third, the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the
mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.
Id. (citation omitted). For example, a search engine query using the registered trademark, "Disneyland," might return, as part of a query result, the web pages of travel
agencies who plan vacations to Disneyland. Therefore, in this example, each travel
agency's web page that was returned would have a meta tag with the keyword, "Disneyland," contained therein.
129. See supra Part I.B.4.
130. Similar web browser functionality could also be placed in peril. For example,
web browser developers may elect to remove the capability of a user to download
web pages since the underlying web source documents can be readily viewed with
supplemental software programs.

131. See, e.g., Richard Johnson, Elements of HTML: A Small Set of Examples (vis-

ited Feb. 27, 1998) <http://www.wolfenet.com/-richj/elements.html>.
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The current protections afforded under the Lanham Act should not
be extended by the courts to provide protection to unexposed trademarks in meta tags. Expansion of the Act to protect against the use of
another's trademark in a meta tag could stifle other developmental
efforts in the software community. 13 Furthermore, if the Lanham
Act's protections were extended to the use of trademarks in meta
tags, there would be no logical reason why it could not be extended to
other identifying indicia. The Act could then be construed as extending protection to other tags in machine-readable computer code
or web page source documents that also cannot be seen by the general
public. Consequently, the "door would be opened," and a variety of
other infringement lawsuits based on the use of another's trademark
in other types or formats of machine-readable computer code would
be allowed.
Recognition of this action could also stifle the development of innovative search engine technology that could possibly resolve these issues before they occur via automation rather than through court
enforcement. The ability of a search engine to identify appropriate
web pages is a measure of the search engine's usefulness or effectiveness. This measure should be enhanced by the implementation of new
computing technology by the engineering and scientific community,
not through the questionable extension and application of old law by
the legal community.
Allowing this type of action could also lead to the creation of new
technological markets that might actually harm the continuing development of the Internet as a viable communication medium. For example, search technology could be developed to "hunt" for trademark
infringement lawsuits based on the information included in meta tags.
Consequently, an author's use of a particular word in a meta tag could
lead to increased exposure to a multitude of trademark infringement
actions in a variety of business sectors where this word is part of another's trademark. The Internet is a remarkable, history-changing information system that is still in its infancy and rapidly growing, both in
size and functionality. As a result, areas may be found where someone might allege that others are attempting to gain a temporary advantage by exploiting temporary technological "holes" in the fabric of
the system. However, "plugging" these "holes" is best left to software
engineers and computer scientists when no apparent harm to anyone
has resulted.

132. Software could be developed to decrease the likelihood of causing confusion
by examining the keywords in a meta tag, checking them against a database of registered trademarks, and then denying usage of those marks which are protected.
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CONCLUSION

Meta tags are instrumental in assisting searches on the Internet. Allowing incidental trademark usage in meta tags serves not only the
web page source creator, but also the general public, and Internet oriented businesses as a whole.
In sum, the inherently concealed nature of a meta tag is the defining
characteristic that precludes extending protection to the unexposed
trademarks contained therein. Since the viewing public does not readily see the trademark, no confusion or misrepresentation can result.
Moreover, the inherently concealed nature of the meta tag prevents a
plaintiff from establishing the requisite element of causation. And finally, this characteristic nullifies the intent requirement of a trademark infringement action. Therefore, the argument that trademark
infringement is unjustified stems not only from a practical standpoint,
but also from the language of the Lanham Act itself.
Public policy dictates that the law surrounding the Internet and its
resources should not be unduly restricted in its early stages of development. Clearly, if the general public in their expertise with search
engines and meta tags ever reaches the confusion threshold envisioned by Congress, the legislature will take appropriate measures to
protect the trademark holder. It is not up to the judiciary to supplant
the legislators' intent and extend the law. Finally, bogging down the
courts in complex evidentiary hearings for trivial lawsuits is a scenario
that should be avoided. Returning to Charlie Marker's suit against
John Developer and his sports news information service, the court
should properly issue the following holding: "Sorry, Charlie!"
Michael R. Sees
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